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"I must confess", wrote a fellow historian to me recently, "that the tendency of 
strategic comment to deal with power situations in a sort of war-game spirit 
rather than as a reflection of real politics involving real people strikes me as 
misguided. I do not think that Third World people are merely pawns in what 
Kipling called 'The Great Game'." I agree with him. However, as conflict situa-
tions always have a public and a private face, I would add the caveat that one 
should attempt to distinguish between them. At an international workshop 
convened recently by the Centre for Conflict Studies a group of scholars 
attempted to do that: to examine the assumptions by which the public face of the 
East-West struggle is conducted, and to suggest means by which the West could 
direct conflict and competition away from the rhetoric-bound public face into 
the private arena, where the West's real strengths — intellectual, spiritual, 
economic and diplomatic — may be brought to bear with some expectation of 
success. In this article I will try to identify the distinctive features of the public 
and private faces of this struggle and to point towards those means by which the 
West can, if not predominate, at least survive the last two decades of this century 
with our political and philosophical heritage, and our societies, intact. 
"The Great Game" whether we call it cold war, détente or superpower 
competition, is the Public Face; it has its own ideology and there are tacit 
conventions for its conduct. The moves in it appear ideologically consistent, to 
correspond with the public mood and an often vaguely-defined "national 
interest". 
The United States and the Soviet Union are bound together by its rules in a 
ritual dance in which cold war and détente have been the principal acts. Détente, 
after all, refers not to an agreement to end conflict, but rather to a continuous 
debate about conflict's bounds and conventions. To end détente would mean 
scrapping the existing conventions and some of the existing assumptions about 
conflict — changing the rules of the Great Game and developing new ones. 
The real game is the Private Face of conflict from which new conventions for 
the Great Game eventually evolve. The language of this face of conflict is less 
conventional, its practice and methods timeless and its realities concealed from 
the great mass of people accustomed to the conventional half-truths and jargon 
which characterize the Public Face. The latter is a front designed to persuade 
people that what they want to believe is true. Its language is that of assurance, of 
familiar devils and enemies who are always wrong. The Private Face is that of 
disequilibrium, of plans gone awry and of uncertainty. It is a gray area in which 
the opponents may share more in common, in means if not in ends, than the 
Public Face would lead us to believe. 
This is scarcely a new situation. Medieval philosophers recognized much the 
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same phenomena and called it the "two truth" theory: there was one truth for 
the cognoscenti and another for the the rest. For the benefit of the latter, 
information was simplified and packaged in tabloid form and doctrine was 
presented as dogma. The cognoscenti were made aware that this was but the 
public face; only an incomplete reflection of the truth. If we are to be the cognos-
centi of our own age, then we must accept a similar caution against mistaking 
for the whole truth the published jargon of the cold war and détente, whether it is 
couched in Marxist-Leninist or so-called liberal-democratic language. The 
Private Face of conflict, concerned with real politics and real people, is more 
important. It is the face that strategic planners in both superpowers would 
ignore at their peril. 
There is a considerable body of evidence to show, as was suggested at the 
beginning of this article, that the superpower strategists do ignore the Private 
Face or, at the very least, misuse it by superimposing the assumptions of the 
Great Game upon it, rather than the reverse. Successive American and Soviet 
administrations have assured us that the world scene should be seen in terms of 
struggle to the death between red-blooded private enterprise and democracy on 
the one hand and cold-blooded Marxist-Leninism and totalitarianism on the 
other. The author would not deny that such a struggle exists, or even that it is 
important, but would suggest rather that it is not the only way in which to 
interpret the current world scene. To do so would be to fly in the face of 
centuries of historical, political, cultural and economic development in Europe, 
whose leaders regard such views as simplistic and ahistorical. Moreover, they 
see the naked power struggle between the Americans and the Soviets in real, not 
abstract terms; if the Public Face conflict gets out of control it is Europe which 
will suffer first and most. Nor is the "East versus West" framework entirely 
appropriate to the Third World. Although the era in which Europeans bestrode 
the world is over, much of what we now call the "South" is stamped with Euro-
pean ideas. This influence cannot be expunged totally from the heritage of the 
peoples it touched. And it may be that Europe's most long-lasting legacy to the 
South is nationalism which, harnessed to both older and newer creeds in the 
emergent nations, cuts across the neat "East-West" boundaries of Public Face 
of conflict. 
Except in Latin America, which was the product of the earlier stage of de-
colonization, today's state systems have been shaped by the experiences of the 
Europeans, their erstwhile colonies and their client states in the recent period of 
imperial decline and fall. Furthermore, although the process of withdrawal is 
virtually over now, the language and attitudes formed during it still pervade 
international relations. However, judging by the policies, the rhetoric and the 
literature of the Soviets, the U.S., the Europeans and the Third World that now 
includes so many ex-colonial territories, each has its own conception of what it 
has inherited from the imperial era and how that era will affect the post-colonial 
one which they have entered. 
A reason for the divergence of view is that imperial withdrawal, which gave 
birth to successor states all over the world, coincided with the emergence of the 
superpowers which saw themselves as successor states on a world scale. In con-
sequence of this second and simultaneous upheaval, a cold war took shape in a 
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new bi-polar power system. The considerations of the polar powers, engaged in 
what they conceived to be a world struggle, infected the actions and conceptions 
of states primarily concerned with imperial withdrawal and national liberation. 
The cold war, in over-lapping the imperial withdrawal, caused the concerns of 
one to confuse policy-making in the other. The confusion has been greater in 
American policy-making for, whereas following Lenin's theory about 
imperialism and capitalism allowed the Soviets to pose unequivocally as the 
champion of the forces of liberation, the US, although ideologically opposed to 
colonialism, found that its interests lay, in some respects although not in all, in 
supporting forms of neo-colonialism. 
The conflict between the superpowers started in Europe where the "iron 
curtain" was established to separate the states in the Soviet system from those 
that were Western or neutral like Austria and Finland. Turbulence accompany-
ing the alignment of this front, in Czechoslovakia and Germany particularly, 
was of low intensity although the front was eventually secured by emplacement 
of conventional and nuclear forces. But with China "lost" conflict spread to the 
East when war began in Korea. Subsequently, two quite different modes of 
conflict, one essentially bi-polar, as in Europe and Korea, and the other low-
intensity and colonial, as in French Indo-China, merged during the American 
phase of the war in Indo-China. Equivocal about what had happened in Europe, 
and with their eyes still fixed on the bi-polar struggle that had started there, the 
Americans tried to establish a cordon sanitaire in the East against communism. 
Naturally, they were unwilling, in doing so, to allow their communist protag-
onist, who regarded himself as being engaged first in a colonial struggle against 
the French and then a post-colonial struggle against a puppet, to reach his goal 
of establishing a sovereign state in succession to the French regime. Similarly, 
the Middle East, a perennial fault system long regarded in the imperial era as 
sensitive, erupted into a front between the peripheral and containing US, on one 
side, and the potentially imperialist Soviet Union on the other. There, too, the 
indigenous peoples were engaged in an internal, post-colonial struggle of great 
complexity into which they were more or less reluctant to admit outsiders. 
The differing goals and experiences of the actors in these simultaneous plays 
accounts for some of the confusion that prevails not only in Western policy but 
in Soviet too about the present scene. The world is filled with unstable states 
representing the detritus of two quite separate historical periods. First, there are 
the states created from pre-1945 colonies; then the autonomous clients and satel-
lites of the super powers whose strategic resources and position are considered 
essential to one or other system. Many of these states, Iraq and Iran for in-
stance, have suffered occupation in the past and they were the victims of power-
play in the imperial era. In quite a different category are the states in Latin 
America that became independent in the nineteenth century but which have not been 
reconstructed since 1945 and have not shared in the Western reform experience. 
The principal concern of all these states is to establish and maintain their 
influence, precarious integrity and sovereignty within a system of states with 
which they share common interests. Their success in doing so depends mainly on 
their political stability and economical health. In seeking stability, the assistance 
of the polar powers may be necessary to these states but it also has been unat-
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tractive to them. For the East-West struggle has, at times, appeared to be a new 
version of the old imperialism. A consideration for unreconstructed states, and 
those that have not stabilized after reconstruction, is that they are under 
pressure from the forces that derive their ideology from the wars of liberation; 
one that has much in common with Marxist or Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Consequently unreconstructed governments tend to be drawn into the East-
West struggle by turning for help to the US against internal so-called "progres-
sive" forces with leftist affiliations. 
Since the form of conflict that has arisen in these states in the post-colonial 
period has been more often non-international than international, it has had the 
appearance of internal struggles to which the rule of non-intervention ought to 
be applicable. However the language in which that rule is expressed is that of the 
stable, imperial era and that of Europe. It may be successfully invoked by 
Poland, even, but the forces that assail unreconstructed states in Latin America, 
for instance, are using the language derived from the colonial wars of liberation. 
Ex-colonial "liberated" states use that language as a link with their heroic past. 
"Liberation" forces, in the post-colonial era fighting unreconstructed but 
indigenous "fascist", "feudal", "racist" and "colonialist" regimes find it 
equally useful. Even terrorist groups with no pretensions to be considered libera-
tors and with no respectable political platforms use the language of liberation. It 
has become the lingua franca of conflict which provides a means of communica-
tion between diverse groups and is a badge of membership. However, it has also 
been the language of Marxist-Leninism, although those who use it are not neces-
sarily Marxist-Leninists. And while language and thought processes and 
methodology are closely related, the message and the media need to be distin-
guished. The message is that the historical movement that started with the with-
drawal from empire, and has now flowed on to overtake the other categories of 
unstable states, is more permanent and that it is independent of the polar ideo-
logical struggle although coloured and exploited by it. 
In accepting the modes and inheritance of the imperial era as parent and guide 
in the present, rather than those of the nouveau and ephemeral bi-polar imperial 
struggle, we should note the diversity of the experience that has been inherited 
from it. Each of the conflicts that accompanied the transfer of colonial power to 
a "reconstructed" state was sui generis, although bi-polar ideology would 
suggest that a shorter or longer set of predictable objective and subjective 
conditons were common to all of them. For instance, the racial, religious, 
physical and economic factors that were decisive during the Malayan Emer-
gency, were not equally significant in Kenya, Palestine, Aden or Northern 
Ireland. And although the French Army distilled its experience in Indo-China 
and applied what it had learned there in Algeria it failed in the latter campaign; 
for the political and moral environments were different and both had changed in 
France in the meanwhile. More important, world opinion, aired in the forum of 
the United Nations and in the Western media, had developed since the early 
fifties. Not to labour a point, each conflict was peculiar, and the side that had 
the clearer aim and had better studied the peculiarities of its own situation in 
time and space was the more successful. Ideology proved to be an impediment in 
the assessment rather than a useful tool if, by ideology, we mean one bought off 
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the peg and derived from a different time and different place. 
Of course, it is the nature of the human mind to simplify complex situations 
by offering generalizations in the form of generic descriptions and ideological 
categories. For similar but opposed political reasons the leaders of the super-
powers have been guilty of trying to "pigeon-hole" both the causes of and solu-
tions to Third World conflict. But nearer to the scene, the indigenous partici-
pants are less able and less inclined to do so. How then, are we to cast "some 
light on our darkness" as we undertook to do in the first of these articles? 
First it must be admitted that there are few, if any, reliable signposts to the 
future. In certain regions of the world — Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America — conflict is inevitable and is likely to continue into the foreseeable 
future. Although overlaid with the jargon and the other impedimenta of the 
East-West struggle, these will remain predominantly conflicts of nationalism. 
They may, of necessity, be revolutionary, but not necessarily Marxist-Leninist. 
For it is not Marxism that is the dominant movement in the world, nor is it 
capitalism or democracy. It is the expansion of the world community of states. 
For too long, Western responses to this movement have allowed the Soviet 
Union to pose, however inappropriately, as the moral, material and military 
champions of third world liberation and development. The West, indeed the 
world, can ill afford to grant the Soviets such an unchallenged monopoly. Quite 
apart from the economic and political implications for the people of the region 
and for the West, it would be morally inexcusable for the West to stand idly by 
when it has by far the greater economic power, technical resources and ability 
and the only political tradition truly committed to human dignity and peaceful 
political evolution. In short, we must coopt or pre-empt the Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary tradition and accept a genuine and sincere long-haul commitment 
to national self-determination in the Third World. Indigenous reaction and 
Soviet imperialism run against this tide. We should not be seen to be doing so as 
well. 
In practical terms, this might mean granting political, material, even military 
assistance to genuine national liberation movements, such as the freedom 
fighters in Afghanistan. The West can make an equally positive contribution by 
helping to resolve peacefully the conflicts of the Third World. The close cooper-
ation of the British Commonwealth in overseeing the peaceful resolution of the 
Zimbabwe civil war and the free election of a black-majority rule government is 
an outstanding example of what the West and the Third World can achieve when 
working in concert towards a worthy common goal. Further opportunities await 
the West in Namibia and South Africa, as well as in Latin America. But such 
achievements cannot be regarded as ends in themselves; they must be followed 
up by foreign aid and investment, such as that needed desperately in Zimbabwe 
now. At the same time the problems of developing nations will not be solved 
simply by throwing money at them. That unfortunate Western tendency is inef-
ficient, demonstrates insensitivity and breeds corruption. Moreover, the West 
cannot afford a commitment that would amount to a kind of economic "Viet-
nam". Assistance must be applied with sufficient care so that it reaches the 
levels of societies where it will do the most good. Joint venture projects — 
Western technical assistance supported by OPEC petrodollars — represent an 
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obvious option. 
Finally, we must be prepared, if necessary, to help guarantee the integrity and 
the security of the new nations. This could mean helping to defend them mili-
tarily, though surely that is a last resort. Their best defences will be healthy, 
educated populations and stable productive economies. This is where we can be 
of greatest assistance and it is in our interest as much as theirs. In short, the 
West must look beyond the Public Face of the East-West struggle and see the 
Great Game in the Third World for what it really is. To win the support of the 
South would be to win in what is the most important arena of conflict. 
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THE TERROR NETWORK 
Holt Rinehart Winston, New York, 1981 
The Reagan Administration took office on the very day the American 
hostages, victims of a major terrorist act, were flown to freedom. The new 
Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, was himself the intended target of 
an assassination attempt in 1979. These two facts may go some way to explain 
the new administration's preoccupation with terrorism as a foreign policy issue, 
an issue which has become clouded in controversy in recent months. Secretary 
Haig opened the debate on January 28th when he accused the Soviet Union of 
"training, funding and equipping" international terrorists and of fostering, 
supporting and expanding their activities.1 The issue reached a high point at the 
end of April as the new Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security opened 
its hearings with testimony from four witnesses (Mrs. Sterling among them) 
who stated that there was evidence to support Mr. Haig's assertions.2 
Some of the controversy relates to the perennial problem of defining 
terrorism. Secretary Haig's remarks seemed to leave the definition broad 
enough to encompass all national liberation movements, including those the 
Americans might feel inclined to support — the Afghan resistance, for example. 
The clear absurdity of so sweeping an interpretation caused the Manchester 
Guardian to query, not without some ironic justice, "Was George Washington a 
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